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Abstract The issue of climate change required the development of the Special Report on
Emission Scenarios (SRES) by the IPCC. The complexity of the subject and the unique
science-policy relation resulted in confusion and discussions appeared in popular media like
The Economist. This paper reviews scenario literature and SRES, identifies the most
vulnerable elements in the communication of SRES. In the communication of GHG
emission scenarios through SRES, the weaknesses that have been identified by the authors
of this paper are the normative character of climate change assessment, the plausibility of
the scenarios, and the risk of simplification of complex messages. The causes of these
communicative issues have been identified as the intrinsic difficulties of interdisciplinary
science, the uniqueness of the science-policy relation, and the need for a high degree of
transparency. This paper suggests improving future communication of complex messages
from scientists to their audience by means of clear reasoning when communicating with
non-scientists, explicitly normative emission scenarios, and increased stakeholder partici-
pation in scenario development.
1 Introduction
The future is uncertain and impossible to predict. However, this uncertainty of the future
often needs to be assessed in order to understand the size and nature of environmental
threats like climatic change.
Assessing the risk of climatic change differs from old school risk analysis because it is
characterised by high risk (EEA 2004), but also by high uncertainty (Grübler and
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Nakicenovic 2001). Climate change can have huge impacts on ecosystems, agriculture,
fisheries, and extreme weather events, and thus affects the lives of practically all people on
planet earth. The uncertainty, on the other hand, is enormous. The uncertainty associated
with future greenhouse gas emissions has been assessed in the Special Report on Emission
Scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 2000, hereafter SRES) of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC). Scenario analysis of a wide spectrum of alternative futures is the
main method used to assess the uncertainty and knowledge gaps associated with future
GHG emissions (SRES, p65). Complex scientific messages being among the most difficult
ones to deliver, the paper focuses on the communication in the framework of SRES.
Because of the high impact of IPCC publications and because long-term forecasting is a
relatively attractive scientific subject, SRES received a lot of attention. A critique on the
measurement of economic output in combination with a lack of understanding of the
concept of scenario analysis lead to the Babel-like confusion of tongues in the ‘Castles and
Henderson affair,1 which reached the non-scientific public (The Economist 2003b,c) and
affected the trust in the findings of the IPCC. The underlying causes of the confusion are
twofold.
First, Castles and Henderson appear not to understand the concept of scenario analysis in
general and SRES in particular. While statisticians focus on trends, scenario annalists focus
on possible trend-breaking. Scenario analysis in SRES is strategic orientation of what may
happen, rather than what is statistically likely to happen. Most of the confusion related to
the concept of scenario analysis can be reduced to three communicative issues, i.e.,
normative elements in the scenarios, probability of the scenarios, and simplifications of the
scenarios, which is elaborated in Section 3.
Second, SRES authors do not obey the statistical conventions around the use of
Purchasing Power Parities (Miketa 2004).2 They anticipate that the difference in price-
levels between OECD countries and non-OECD counties will diminish as the income-gap
between OECD countries and non-OECD counties closes. This method was not
documented in SRES, however, but first published years later (Manne et al. 2005). The
confusion related to the use of MER vs. PPP is funded in methodological issues, i.e.,
interdisciplinary science, the stakeholder-involvement, and the degree of transparency,
which is elaborated in Section 4.
This paper aims to contribute to a better communication between scientists and their
non-scientific audience. Specifically, the paper reviews scenario literature and SRES in
Section 2. Section 3 identifies the most vulnerable elements in the communication of SRES.
The latter elements are commented upon in Section 4 to explain them being sources of
miscommunication. The concluding remarks should give guidance to reduce the risk of
1 Castles and Henderson put together a critique on SRES. Their main points of criticism were the metric for
economic output, Market Exchange Rates (MER) rather than Purchasing Power Parities (PPP), and the
plausibility of the scenarios that assume gap-closing between income levels in OECD countries and non-
OECD countries. A group of authors connected with SRES responded to the critique, followed by a reply
from Castles and Henderson, and again a response from a group of SRES authors (Castles and Henderson
2003a,b; Grübler et al. 2004; Nakicenovic et al. 2003). Castles and Henderson argue that, when PPP is used
instead of MER, the base-year levels of developing countries are much higher. Consequently the projections
of economic output are also much higher.
2 “Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) are currency conversion rates that both convert to a common currency
and equalise the purchasing power of different currencies. In other words, they eliminate the differences in
price levels between countries in the process of conversion.” (OECD 2005). PPP is the preferred quantity of
economic output among economists (Maddison 2004).
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miscommunication and thus offering suggestions to improve future communication of
complex messages from scientists to their audience.
2 Description of IPCC emissions scenarios
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio de
Janeiro (UNCED 1992) made the curbing of greenhouse gasses (GHG) an important issue
on the international political agenda. Most developed countries3 committed themselves to
do so in the Kyoto protocol (UNFCCC 1997).
SRES was developed because the IPCC needed new scenarios for their Third
Assessment Report (TAR). The reasons for new scenarios were both developments that
differed from the assumptions within earlier IPCC scenarios, and new insights in scenario
analysis (SRES, p66).4 The objectives of SRES are threefold (SRES, p64):
& To provide input for evaluating climatic and environmental consequences of alternative
future GHG emissions in the absence of specific measures to reduce such emissions or
enhance GHG sinks.
& To provide input for assessing mitigation and adaptation possibilities, and their costs, in
different regions and economic sectors.
& To provide input to negotiations of possible agreements to reduce GHG emissions.
The first two objectives relate to TAR. The third objective suggests a wide use of the
scenarios outside the scientific arena.
A specification of SRES is to “cover a wide spectrum of alternative futures to reflect
relevant uncertainties and knowledge gaps” (SRES, p65), and therefore SRES assesses
uncertainties associated with climate change issues. SRES is, however, limited to so-called
non-intervention scenarios because “SRES scenarios do not include any explicit additional
climate policy initiatives in accordance with the Terms of Reference” (SRES, p81).5
The method used in SRES is scenario analysis, although elements from other forecasting
techniques have also been used. Trend extrapolation6 has been used to identify relations
between scenario drivers, e.g., the relation between income and energy intensity (SRES,
p125). Analogous thinking7 is not explicitly used; however, SRES assumes a certain
consistency of the development paths of non-OECD countries and OECD countries.8
Delphi-like methods9 have been used to construct the storylines. Relevance tree analysis10
10 Analysis of main drivers of change.
9 The ‘Delphi method’ was developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s as a method for gathering
information about the future in order to study future non-surface inter-continental warfare in a broad way. It
is based on an iterative process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, with synthesis becoming the new thesis.
The goal is consensus building among experts (Ringland 1998, p19).
8 Future rates of change of indicators like ‘energy intensity’ in non-OECD countries are within the
boundaries of historic fast and slow changes in OECD countries.
7 Assuming analogies between future developments of non-OECD (developing) countries and past
developments of OECD (developed) countries.
6 Extrapolation of historic trends.
5 Note: the authors of this paper cannot find such a restriction in the ‘Terms of Reference’ (SRES, p324–325).
4 E.g., legislative changes like the Clean Air Act in the US, and the need for gap-closing scenarios (see
Section 3).
3 The United States are a notable exception.
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has been used in terms of analysis of key driving forces of GHG emissions. Using the latter
methods and techniques, SRES first developed four storylines and next developed scenarios
based on the storylines.11 Scenarios12 that are based on the same storyline13 are said to
belong to the same scenario family (SRES, pp69–71). Based on the four scenario families,
six scenario groups were developed.14 There is no traditional trend/Business-as-Usual
scenario (Craig et al. 2002; Turkenburg 1993), because the long-term scope of the climate
change problem requires strategic orientation on several possible developments. In SRES,
there are four so-called scenario families and all scenarios are “equally possible” (SRES,
p172). The scenarios “represent pertinent, plausible alternative futures” (SRES, p64).
The scenarios are labeled along two orthogonal axes: (1) Global vs. Regional, and (2)
Economic vs. Environmental (SRES, p170; see Fig. 1). Each of the four scenario families is
built on a set of (qualitative) assumptions and GDP projections that form a coherent
storyline. Some SRES authors state that the socio-economic variables cannot be combined
freely15 and the SRES authors attempted to combine them based on their interdependency
(Grübler and Nakicenovic 2001).
“SRES was designed to provide insights on uncertainty from a range of plausible
scenarios” (Grübler et al. 2004). SRES concludes a high uncertainty of future GHG
emissions, ranging from low levels (B1, A1T) to very high levels (A2, A1FI) in 2100 (see
Fig. 2). It should be noted that higher economic growth does not automatically result in
higher GHG emissions, and that within one scenario family very different emission paths
are possible (see e.g., different A1 scenarios in Fig. 2). Both low and high emission
scenarios are treated as “equally possible” in SRES (p172) and “probabilities or likelihoods
are not assigned to individual SRES scenarios” (SRES, p315). Section 3.2 elaborates on the
plausibility, possibility, and probability of the scenario families.
3 SRES and communicative issues
The three main communicative issues, the use of descriptive scenarios, plausibility of the
scenarios, and simplification of complex messages, are discussed in separate sections
below. It should be noted that there appear to be some inconsistencies in SRES and between
SRES and separate publications about SRES by SRES-authors regarding the desirability
and probability of the scenarios. Regarding the desirability some individual SRES authors
state that SRES describes the B1 world as rather desirable (van Vuuren and de Vries
2001),16 while the scenarios are not intended to be desirable (or undesirable) and do not
11 A total of 40 scenarios were developed.
12 “Scenario (generic): A plausible and often simplified description of how the future may develop, based on
a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about key driving forces (e.g., rate of technology
change, prices) and relationships. Scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts and sometimes may be
based on a “narrative storyline.” Scenarios may be derived from projections, but are often based on additional
information from other sources.” (IPCC 2004).
13 “(Scenario) Storyline: A narrative description of a scenario (or family of scenarios) highlighting the main
scenario characteristics, relationships between key driving forces, and the dynamics of their evolution.”
(IPCC 2004).
14 A1B, A2, B1, B2, A1T, and A1FI.
15 E.g., zero economic growth cannot be combined with rapid technological change and productivity growth
(Grübler and Nakicenovic 2001).
16 “A prosperous and fair world (with) a general orientation towards sustainable development.”
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represent preferred developments (SRES, p64). Regarding the probability the scenarios are
treated as equally possible (SRES 4.2.1) and thus do not have a Business-as-Usual scenario
(SRES, p172), while some individual SRES authors consider the B2 world as Dynamics-as-
Usual (Kram et al. 2000; Riahi and Roehrl 2000).17 The inconsistencies shown by the
SRES authors18 illustrate the difficulties and pitfalls associated with the SRES message.
The question that comes to mind is how policymakers should be able to cope with these
issues if even the authors show their struggles to do so.
3.1 The use of descriptive scenarios to assess a normative problem
Scenarios cannot be value free (SRES, p64). The SRES scenarios are intended to be
descriptive, however, not normative (SRES, p64). The use of descriptive scenarios is indeed
the common approach for model-oriented science, but it is also associated with possible
pitfalls.
Fig. 1 Relative orientation of the four SRES scenario families
18 IPCC scientists should clarify their position if there is any chance on confusion (Kaiser 2005).
17 While the audience, by lack of guidance, makes its own choices and is allowed to choose even A1FI as
‘business-as-usual’ (Hillman 2004, p19, p48).
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Although scenarios are meant to be descriptive, some normative elements have entered
into the storylines. This is unavoidable. It is also unavoidable that some scenarios are
preferred over others by the scenario developers. The B1 scenario is generally seen as
positive and A2 as negative (Castles and Henderson 2003a; Kram et al. 2000, as interpreted
by Lomborg 2001, p282; Muskulus and Jacob 2005; Smith et al. 2000; Trnka et al. 2004).
In SRES a strong welfare network (SRES, p182) is added unnecessarily19 to the
aggregation of assumptions that led to the optimistic B1 scenario. By adding this
politically-coloured element to the optimistic B1 scenario, SRES seems to take position in
the debate around welfare networks. Similarly SRES seems to take position against market-
based solutions by adding this policy instrument to the aggregation of assumptions that led
to the materialistic A1 world and opposite to the one leading to the sustainable development
oriented B1 world. Therefore SRES is suggestive in representing the worldview of certain
parties, and to favour certain parties’ solutions for problems.20,21 Remarkably market-based
solutions are amongst the most effective policy options to address the main environmental
problems and to achieve sustainable development (OECD 2001b, Ch 25). However in
SRES, market-based solutions are associated with the A1 scenario that is positioned in
contrast to sustainable development.
Some SRES authors state that the scenario variables are interdependent (Grübler and
Nakicenovic 2001). In SRES socio-economic variables and policies are aggregated
according to their assumed interdependency. However, the combinations of socio-economic
19 SRES does not explain why the strong welfare network is added to the B1 scenario, nor does SRES cite
literature underpinning the causal relation between strong welfare networks and the sustainable development
oriented B1 world.
21 Reviewers of this paper state that we do not understand SRES by saying that SRES is suggestive in
representing the worldview of certain parties. Nevertheless we chose to keep our statement as an illustrative
example of a possible misinterpretation of SRES.
20 E.g., the RIVM couples worldviews and political parties to SRES-based scenarios (RIVM 2004, p50–51).
Fig. 2 CO2 emissions of the four SRES scenario families
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variables and policies are based on opinions. Therefore, value-loaded elements are
unnecessarily incorporated in scenarios that are intended to be descriptive. The statement
in SRES that the variables are interdependent is therefore also a statement that e.g., market-





























































Source: calculated from the IPCC website (http://sres.ciesin.org/final_data.html)  
Fig. 3 Income in SRES scenarios
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In SRES the aggregation of the scenario variables is disputable and the impression is
given that the aggregation is based on the worldviews of the scenario developers. Political
goals and political means are mixed up in such a way that mainly Western European left-
wing parties see their worldviews recognisably represented in the SRES scenarios. As for
an example, global sustainability is associated with “improved equity” (SRES, p174), and
“a strong welfare net” (SRES, p182). In a paper describing the IMAGE-B2 scenario22 some
SRES authors associate global sustainability with the market ideology becoming less
dominant (de Vries et al. 2000) and SRES associates market-based solutions with the
seemingly unsustainable A1 world (SRES, 4.3.1). By incorporating the left-wing dogmas
that sustainable development is associated with planned economies (less market ideology)23
and levelling of income (improved equity and strong welfare net), SRES can be seen as
stoutly offensive against some in other parts of the geographical and political spectrum, like
US Republicans.24
An obvious normative element in SRES is the income gap closure between OECD
countries and non-OECD countries (see Fig. 3). In the evaluation of previous IPCC
emission scenarios it was concluded that scenarios with a significant closure of the income
gap between OECD and non-OECD countries was needed (SRES, p66, p123) (Alcamo et
al. 1995). There was, however, no scientific reasoning in Alcamo et al. to incorporate such
a development path in SRES. Apparently the urge to avoid ‘Being unfair to the South’
(Parikh 1992) was sufficient to include scenarios with implausible high growth rates for
developing regions (see Section 3.2). Being fair does not seem to be very compatible with
descriptive scenario development, to say the least.
SRES is vulnerable because of its attempt to be descriptive.25 The normative elements
that entered into SRES made it prone to be misused to justify political opinions, especially
because the normative elements in SRES have an air of favouring certain parties and certain
parties’ solutions for problems. Most problems with normative elements could be avoided
by explicitly labelling them as normative. It is less offending for people who do not agree
with normative elements, if these elements are presented as normative rather than subjec-
tive science. The subject is too normative to be handled with descriptive scenarios (Swart
et al. 2004).
3.2 Plausibility, possibility, probability, and pertinence of the scenarios
According to SRES, the scenarios “represent pertinent, plausible alternative futures”
(SRES, p64)26,27 which are “treated as equally possible” (SRES, p172),28 and “no single
scenario was treated as more or less ‘probable’ than others belonging to the same family”
(SRES, p176).29
22 One of the six marker-scenarios.
23 Free and fair trade – and thus market ideology becoming more dominant – is a necessity for non-OECD
countries to fight poverty (Bhagwati 2004; Hertz 2004).
24 “The American way of life is not up for negotiation.” the elder George Bush at the first Earth Summit in
Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (The Economist 2003a).
25 “The SRES scenarios are descriptive” (SRES, p64).
26 Pertinent: “relevant to something” (Oxford Dictionary).
27 Plausible: “seeming to be right or reasonable” (Oxford Dictionary).
28 Possible: “that can exist or happen, though not certain to” (Oxford Dictionary).
29 Probable: “likely to happen, exist or be true”(Oxford Dictionary).
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According to SRES the plausibility of the scenarios is based on an extensive review of
the emissions scenarios available in the literature, and has been tested by alternative
modeling approaches, by peer review, and by the IPCC review and approval process
(SRES, p64). Nevertheless the plausibility, possibility, persistency, and/or probability of the
scenarios has been the main topic of dispute in the literature (Allen 2003; Grübler and
Nakicenovic 2001; Kriegler and Bruckner 2004; Lempert et al. 2004; Lomborg 2001,
p280–287; Pittock 2002; Pittock et al. 2001; Reilly et al. 2001; Schneider 2001; Schneider
and Mastrandrea 2005; Webster et al. 2003), especially the Castles and Henderson critique
(Castles and Henderson 2003a,b; Grübler et al. 2004; Nakicenovic et al. 2003). In this
section, the economic development in the A1 AIM marker scenario (see Fig. 3) is used to
illustrate communicative issues linked to the concepts of plausibility, possibility,
persistency, and probability.
Historical GDP per capita growth has been as high as 8% for Japan in the period 1950–
1973, but in terms of half a century (half the period SRES considers) annual growth rates
have not exceeded 3% (Maddison 2001, p126). As Fig. 3 shows several SRES scenarios
include growth rates of over 3% for a hundred years period (see also McKibbin et al.
2004a,b). If such scenarios can be considered possible and plausible depends on the
context. Unfortunately in SRES context for these high growth scenarios is not sufficiently
provided in the sections dealing with economic development (SRES, p92–95, 194–200). In
the context of historic developments and scientific knowledge on economic growth, the
high growth scenarios are not plausible. Nevertheless scenario developers can alter the
context is such a way that high growth scenarios become plausible. High growth scenarios
are not impossible, because without restrictions everything is possible.30 SRES authors do,
however, restrict the reach of ‘possible’ by stating that: “it is not possible to treat
uncertainties of future demographic, economic, and technological developments as
independent.” (SRES 3.3.3), and “a ‘free,’ or ‘modeler’s choice,’ numeric combination of
scenario indicators is simply not possible.” (SRES 4.4.2.1). Therefore SRES authors do
base the reach of possible on logic derived from past developments. From this particular
interpretation of possible, the high growth scenarios seem impossible. Only clear reason-
ing can provide the context to consider the high growth as possible and plausible. SRES
lacks to provide such a context and without a clear given context readers will create their
own context.
The plausibility of so-called non-intervention scenarios (no action taken to curb GHG
emissions, hereafter ‘baseline scenarios’) is awkward anyway because implementing no
policy at all is not likely to occur. As for an example, the sustainable development oriented
B1 scenario covers policies against e.g., acidification (SRES, p65, specification 7) and at
the same time implements no GHG policies at all. It is rather unlikely, and not plausible,
that action is taken against all environmental treats except for climatic change. Including
such policies affect the baseline character of the scenarios.31
The SRES scenario families are not equally plausible. Scenarios that explore the upper
or lower boundaries of salient scenario driving forces (Nakicenovic et al. 2003) are
differently (not less!) plausible than ‘dynamics-as-usual’ scenarios. In analogy the
plausibility of ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ scenarios are differently plausible than neutral
scenarios. Moreover, as mentioned in footnote 25, free and fair trade – and thus market
30 “Nothing is impossible, just improbable.” (Douglas Adams’ Hitchhikers guide to the galaxy).
31 It could be argued that this is a false ceteris paribus condition because stringent environmental policies in
the absence of GHG policies are not plausible. For a line of reasoning that the “no-control” assumption can
be consistent with a global focus to sustainable development see: (de Vries et al. 2000).
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ideology becoming more dominant – is a necessity for non-OECD countries to develop and
overcome poverty according to mainstream economic thought (Bhagwati 2004; Hertz
2004). Therefore, associating high economic growth in non-OECD counties with market
ideology becoming less dominant is implausible.
Treating the scenarios as “equally possible” confuses the communication because they
are obviously not. Without likelihood assessment scenario analysis looses a lot of weight
(Schneider 2001) and, in our opinion, becomes a toothless tiger. Therefore the plausibility
needs to be assessed. The assessment however, does not necessarily need to be as
quantitative as suggested (Schneider 2001). Quantitative assessment with probability
distribution functions, as performed by Mastrandrea and Schneider (2004), tends to pull the
focus of the audience towards dynamics-as-usual scenarios. Assessment of plausibility can
alternatively be performed qualitatively by labeling the scenarios explicitly. Experiences
from the Shell scenario group tell that likelihood assessment, although mostly qualitative, is
a key factor in the communication process (Schwartz 1998). The communication of the
scenarios can be improved by naming the scenarios in such a way that the names appeal to
the intuition of the audience. Qualitative assessment by explicitly labelling the scenarios
according to their plausibility can overcome the plausibility dilemma without incorporating
the disadvantages of probability distributions.
Castles and Henderson would probably not have been targeting the plausibility of the
SRES scenarios when B1 would have been labelled as ‘extremely optimistic’ regarding the
economic development of non-OECD countries. SRES would not have been such an easy
target when normative elements would have been labelled explicitly as normative (see e.g.,
Schneider and Mastrandrea 2005).
3.3 The risk of simplification
The message of SRES is a complex one with counter-intuitive elements. In a nutshell,
SRES concludes that scenarios with different socio-economic drivers can lead to similar
cumulative emissions, while similar driving forces can branch out into different categories
of cumulative emissions (SRES, p315). According to some authors, SRES contains the
message that lower GDP does not automatically leads to lower emissions and that high
GDP does not automatically lead to higher emissions (Grübler et al. 2004). The concept of
sustainable development is an integrated part of SRES. The concept of sustainable
development does not oppose economic development to the environment.
In the storylines and the 2×2 matrix, economic orientation and environmental
orientation are presented as opposites (see Fig. 1).32 The presentation of the economy
and the environment as opposites has potentially a very high impact on the communication
of SRES, because it polarises the discussion to pre-sustainable development logic, where
economic development and the environment are seen as opposites (Schwartz 1998). Quite
the opposite of the message SRES intended to bring. Moreover putting Economy and
Environment as opposites on one axis (SRES, p170) implies a choice between economy
and environment. It therefore makes the SRES prone to be used to justify political choices
without SRES providing any solid justification for those choices. It is considered one of the
32 There is no strong scientific support for both environmental degradation as a consequence of economic
growth, and, more important for the concept of sustainable development, reduced economic growth as a
consequence of tighter environmental policy (Chua 1999). Moreover, there is no a priori reason for economic
activity to harm the environment, use energy, or emit GHGs (Chua 1999; Craig et al. 2002; Schipper et al.
2001; Smil 2000).
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potential vulnerabilities of scenarios (Keepin and Wynne 1984), especially because
opposing ‘Economy’ to ‘Environment’ seems to support the worldview of only a single
part of the political spectrum. Alternative ideologies, like the one supported by the current
Dutch minister of economic affairs, consider economic growth as a necessary, although not
sufficient, condition to implement environmental policies (Brinkhorst 2004). Those
politicians see their worldview neglected by the IPCC in the 2×2 matrix, in Fig. 1.
4 Discussion and conclusions
The issues mentioned in the previous Section 3 arise from the interdisciplinary character of
SRES, the extraordinary relation between science and policy, and lack of transparency of
the report. These issues are discussed below.
4.1 Interdisciplinary science
Performing interdisciplinary science requires scientists from all disciplines that are directly
related to the subject. Watson states that the TAR, and thus SRES, is characterized by
insufficient involvement of leading macro-economists (Watson 2002). The dispute with
Castles and Henderson can be seen as an exponent of this insufficient involvement of
leading macro-economists.
The absence of scientists from relevant disciplines is reflected in the choice of the key
driving forces identified in SRES. There is a strong emphasis on easily quantifiable drivers
like GDP, population, and technology, but other drivers like institutional frameworks, are
only vaguely discussed in the storylines. See for comparison the more comprehensive
assessment of driving forces in the OECD Environmental Outlook (OECD 2001b) and
Global Environment Outlook 3 scenarios (Bakkes et al. 2004).
The insufficient involvement of leading macro-economists (Watson 2002) ended in non-
specialist scientists to perform advanced economic tasks, thus ignoring the importance of
economics regarding long-term energy scenarios. This apparent attitude disturbs the
communication with the economic community, and with one of the stakeholders in the
sustainability debate.33 When performing multidisciplinary science, the mono-disciplinary
sciences should not be ignored. As for a comparison, in the OECD Environmental Outlook
(OECD 2001b) the economic part of the research was conducted by OECD,34 while the
environmental pressures were handled by the Stockholm Environment Institute – Boston35
(Kemp-Benedict and Raskin 2001; Schenk 2000). Approval of leading macro-economists is
needed to build trust in the economic projections.
4.2 Science-policy relation
Because of the high stakes and high uncertainties, the science-policy interface of climatic
change is the domain of so-called post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993).
Moreover, climatic change issues deal with e.g., inter-generational justice, long-term
33 E.g., the choice of the SRES authors to disregard the statistical conventions has confused the discussion
regarding the use of PPP and MER to a great extent (Miketa 2004).
34 http://www.oecd.org/
35 http://www.seib.org/
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effects, and huge time-lags between cause and effect. Justice is normative, and therefore
climate change issues are normative (Schneider and Mastrandrea 2005). The use of
descriptive scenarios for a normative problem leads to the conflicts described in Section 3.1.
The communication can be improved by the development of normative but consistent
scenarios, preferably developed in co-operation with relevant stakeholders.
The post-normal science-policy relation requires extension of the peer communities
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). Therefore, policy makers should be involved in an early
stage of the scientific process. The policy makers should be involved in the model
development, similar to the UN ECE acid rain negotiations (Tuinstra et al. 1999). Similarly
in the OECD Environmental Outlook and Strategy program (OECD 2001a,b) a steering
committee (with policy makers) was involved in order to make sure the scientists answered
the questions the policymakers wanted. The steering committee also helped to avoid issues
that were too politically sensitive and could potentially block the acceptance of the reports.
Additionally a draft of the report received comments during a High Level Segment meeting
of the OECD Environmental Policy Committee (EPOC). In the process of the next OECD
Environmental Outlook the policy makers from all OECD countries, except The Nether-
lands, demanded for a single reference scenario instead of several scenarios analogous to
SRES (Visser, 2004, personal communication).
The unique science-policy relation urges to go beyond the traditional science-policy
relation (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). Stakeholder analysis (know who the stakeholders
are and what they want) and stakeholder-involved scenario development has a huge
potential in climate change issues (van Grinsven, 2004, personal communication).
Stakeholder involvement requires, however, a different approach towards scenario
development, like stakeholder-involved scenario development. The role of the scientists
would be to provide guidance to the stakeholders.
4.3 Transparency
Being transparent is one of SRES’ own specifications (SRES, p65, specification 8). One
can argue that SRES itself is insufficiently transparent. While much information could have
been presented in a more concise manner, information about the key socio-economic
driving forces (population and GDP) is presented only in tables or unclear graphs. Historic
developments as well as projections, presented with both absolute levels and average
annual changes of key drivers, would allow readers to compare consequences of the
different scenarios at a glance.
It is unclear whether the four SRES scenarios sufficiently cover a wide spectrum of
alternative futures (SRES, p65, specification 3 & 8) with the division in global vs. regional
and economic vs. environmental. SRES does not elaborate on the sufficiency of the
scenarios to meet the objective of covering the uncertainties.
SRES aims to assess the uncertainty in driving forces by means of the IPAT identity36 to
organise the discussion on GHG emission driving forces (SRES, p105). However, by doing
so SRES unwillingly understates the relative importance of key driving forces like
institutional frameworks (OECD, 2001b).
36 I=P*A*T, with I: environmental impact; P: population; A: affluence (GDP/P); T: technology (I/GDP),
(Ehrlich and Holdren 1971; Kaya 1990).
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The use of six models does not improve transparency. The main document should also
explain why specifically the used models (not more, less or other) cover the uncertainty due
to models structure. Despite the many pages, the conceptual differences between the models
are not transparently described and discussed in the report. The communication and
reliability would increase with the use of one official model and several supportive mo-
dels, analogous to the modeling framework of the UN ECE acid rain negotiations (Tuinstra
et al. 1999).
There is much information on general background information, but how exactly
storylines were quantified into model input parameters is not transparently presented.
Transparent information about the assumptions and the relative importance of the
assumptions is needed. Eye-balling the shapes of the carbon dioxide emissions scenarios
suggest that fossil resource availability plays a dominant role in the differences between the
scenarios. Although uncertainty analysis has been performed (e.g., in van der Sluijs et al.
2001), the transparency could improve by presenting a simplified but representative
sensitivity analysis in a transparent way in the main document.
Transparency about normative elements potentially increases the communication.
Stakeholder-involved scenario development makes it easier for the scientists to identify
normative elements and label them explicitly.
5 Concluding remarks
In the communication of GHG emission scenarios through SRES, the weaknesses that have
been identified by the authors of this paper are the normative character of climate change
assessment (Section 3.1), the plausibility of the scenarios (Section 3.2), and the risk of
simplification of complex messages (Section 3.3). The causes of these communicative
issues have been identified as the intrinsic difficulties of interdisciplinary science
(Section 4.1), the uniqueness of the science-policy relation (Section 4.2), and the need
for a high degree of transparency (Section 4.3).
Our main message to scenario developers is therefore: ‘Keep It Simple, Scientists’ (KISS).
Above all the reader needs clear reasoning. Scientific conclusions are to be discussed in
scientific journals and the switching to a different modus is required whenever writing reports
like SRES. The summaries in SRES are too vague. It matters what the stakeholders need to
know, rather than what the scientists think the stakeholder needs to know.
The extraordinary science-policy relation (Section 4.2) means extreme caution and
changes the way of conducting science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). The use of cultural
perspectives is common in environmental sciences (de Vries 2001; Moll 1993; Noorman
1995) but should not be used in post-normal science because one risks the perception of the
moral superiority37 of one worldview over the other. In SRES the apparent moral
superiority of the B1 scenario over the others disturbs the dialogue with important
stakeholders.
The normative character of climate change scenarios (Section 3.1) requires explicitly
normative emission scenarios. Stakeholder participation in scenario development enables
stakeholder groups to obtain sets of scenarios suitable for their specific situation.
Experiences with stakeholder participation in scenario development shows the relevance
37 During the Athenian democracy in ancient times, many well-known politicians were ostracised because
the citizens could not bear their moral superiority (Greene 1998, Ch. 42).
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of such an approach (Carlsson-Kanyama et al. 2003). On the other hand, scientists should
confront stakeholders with limitations obtained from scientific knowledge. In order not to
loose their reliability and credibility, scientists should not give into ridiculous demands
from stakeholders, like the non-intervention restriction (SRES, p81).
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